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Abstract. We present layered concurrent programs, a compact and
expressive notation for specifying reﬁnement proofs of concurrent pro-
grams. A layered concurrent program speciﬁes a sequence of connected
concurrent programs, from most concrete to most abstract, such that
common parts of diﬀerent programs are written exactly once. These pro-
grams are expressed in the ordinary syntax of imperative concurrent
programs using gated atomic actions, sequencing, choice, and (recursive)
procedure calls. Each concurrent program is automatically extracted
from the layered program. We reduce reﬁnement to the safety of a
sequence of concurrent checker programs, one each to justify the connec-
tion between every two consecutive concurrent programs. These checker
programs are also automatically extracted from the layered program.
Layered concurrent programs have been implemented in the Civl veriﬁer
which has been successfully used for the veriﬁcation of several complex
concurrent programs.
1 Introduction
Reﬁnement is an approach to program correctness in which a program is
expressed at multiple levels of abstraction. For example, we could have a sequence
of programs P1, . . . ,Ph,Ph+1 where P1 is the most concrete and the Ph+1 is the
most abstract. Program P1 can be compiled and executed eﬃciently, Ph+1 is
obviously correct, and the correctness of Pi is guaranteed by the correctness of
Pi+1 for all i ∈ [1, h]. These three properties together ensure that P1 is both eﬃ-
cient and correct. To use the reﬁnement approach, the programmer must come
up with each version Pi of the program and a proof that the correctness of Pi+1
implies the correctness of Pi. This proof typically establishes a connection from
every behavior of Pi to some behavior of Pi+1.
Reﬁnement is an attractive approach to the veriﬁed construction of complex
programs for a number of reasons. First, instead of constructing a single mono-
lithic proof of P1, the programmer constructs a collection of localized proofs
establishing the connection between Pi and Pi+1 for each i ∈ [1, h]. Each local-
ized proof is considerably simpler than the overall proof because it only needs to
reason about the (relatively small) diﬀerence between adjacent programs. Sec-
ond, diﬀerent localized proofs can be performed using diﬀerent reasoning meth-
ods, e.g., interactive deduction, automated testing, or even informal reasoning.
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Fig. 1. Concurrent programs Pi and connecting checker programs Ci represented by a
layered concurrent program LP.
Finally, reﬁnement naturally supports a bidirectional approach to correctness—
bottom-up veriﬁcation of a concrete program via successive abstraction or top-
down derivation from an abstract program via successive concretization.
This paper explores the use of reﬁnement to reason about concurrent pro-
grams. Most reﬁnement-oriented approaches model a concurrent program as a
ﬂat transition system, a representation that is useful for abstract programs but
becomes increasingly cumbersome for a concrete implementation. To realize the
goal of veriﬁed construction of eﬃcient and implementable concurrent programs,
we must be able to uniformly and compactly represent both highly-detailed and
highly-abstract concurrent programs. This paper introduces layered concurrent
programs as such a representation.
A layered concurrent program LP represents a sequence P1, . . . ,Ph,Ph+1 of
concurrent programs such that common parts of diﬀerent programs are written
exactly once. These programs are expressed not as ﬂat transition systems but
in the ordinary syntax of imperative concurrent programs using gated atomic
actions [4], sequencing, choice, and (recursive) procedure calls. Our programming
language is accompanied by a type system that allows each Pi to be automat-
ically extracted from LP. Finally, reﬁnement between Pi and Pi+1 is encoded
as the safety of a checker program Ci which is also automatically extracted from
LP. Thus, the veriﬁcation of P1 is split into the veriﬁcation of h concurrent
checker programs C1, . . . , Ch such that Ci connects Pi and Pi+1 (Fig. 1).
We highlight two crucial aspects of our approach. First, while the programs Pi
have an interleaved (i.e., preemptive) semantics, we verify the checker programs
Ci under a cooperative semantics in which preemptions occur only at procedure
calls. Our type system [5] based on the theory of right and left movers [10] ensures
that the cooperative behaviors of Ci cover all preemptive behaviors of Pi. Second,
establishing the safety of checker programs is not tied to any particular veriﬁ-
cation technique. Any applicable technique can be used. In particular, diﬀerent
layers can be veriﬁed using diﬀerent techniques, allowing for great ﬂexibility in
veriﬁcation options.
1.1 Related Work
This paper formalizes, clariﬁes, and extends the most important aspect of
the design of Civl [6], a deductive veriﬁer for layered concurrent programs.
Hawblitzel et al. [7] present a partial explanation of Civl by formalizing the
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connection between two concurrent programs as sound program transformations.
In this paper, we provide the ﬁrst formal account for layered concurrent pro-
grams to represent all concurrent programs in a multi-layered reﬁnement proof,
thereby establishing a new foundation for the veriﬁed construction of concurrent
programs.
Civl is the successor to the Qed [4] veriﬁer which combined a type system for
mover types with logical reasoning based on veriﬁcation conditions. Qed enabled
the speciﬁcation of a layered proof but required each layer to be expressed in
a separate ﬁle leading to code duplication. Layered programs reduce redundant
work in a layered proof by enabling each piece of code to be written exactly once.
Qed also introduced the idea of abstracting an atomic action to enable attach-
ing a stronger mover type to it. This idea is incorporated naturally in layered
programs by allowing a concrete atomic action to be wrapped in a procedure
whose speciﬁcation is a more abstract atomic action with a more precise mover
type.
Event-B [1] is a modeling language that supports reﬁnement of systems
expressed as interleaved composition of events, each speciﬁed as a top-level
transition relation. Veriﬁcation of Event-B speciﬁcations is supported by the
Rodin [2] toolset which has been used to model and verify several systems of
industrial signiﬁcance. TLA+ [9] also speciﬁes systems as a ﬂat transition sys-
tem, enables reﬁnement proofs, and is more general because it supports liveness
speciﬁcations. Our approach to reﬁnement is diﬀerent from Event-B and TLA+
for several reasons. First, Event-B and TLA+ model diﬀerent versions of the
program as separate ﬂat transition systems whereas our work models them as
diﬀerent layers of a single layered concurrent program, exploiting the standard
structuring mechanisms of imperative programs. Second, Event-B and TLA+
connect the concrete program to the abstract program via an explicitly speciﬁed
reﬁnement mapping. Thus, the guarantee provided by the reﬁnement proof is
contingent upon trusting both the abstract program and the reﬁnement map-
ping. In our approach, once the abstract program is proved to be free of failures,
the trusted part of the speciﬁcation is conﬁned to the gates of atomic actions in
the concrete program. Furthermore, the programmer never explicitly speciﬁes a
reﬁnement mapping and is only engaged in proving the correctness of checker
programs.
The methodology of reﬁnement mappings has been used for compositional
veriﬁcation of hardware designs [11,12]. The focus in this work is to decompose
a large reﬁnement proof connecting two versions of a hardware design into a
collection of smaller proofs. A variety of techniques including compositional rea-
soning (converting a large problem to several small problems) and customized
abstractions (for converting inﬁnite-state to ﬁnite-state problems) are used to
create small and ﬁnite-state veriﬁcation problems for a model checker. This work
is mostly orthogonal to our contribution of layered programs. Rather, it could be
considered an approach to decompose the veriﬁcation of each (potentially large)
checker program encoded by a layered concurrent program.
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2 Concurrent Programs
In this section we introduce a concurrent programming language. The syntax of
our programming language is summarized in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Concurrent programs
Preliminaries. Let Val be a set of values containing the Booleans. The set of
variables Var is partitioned into global variables GVar and local variables LVar .
A store σ is a mapping from variables to values, an expression e is a mapping
from stores to values, and a transition t is a binary relation between stores.
Atomic Actions. A fundamental notion in our approach is that of an atomic
action. An atomic action captures an indivisible operation on the program state
together with its precondition, providing a universal representation for both low-
level machine operations (e.g., reading a variable from memory) and high-level
abstractions (e.g., atomic procedure summaries). Most importantly for reasoning
purposes, our programming language conﬁnes all accesses to global variables to
atomic actions. Formally, an atomic action is a tuple (I,O, e, t). The semantics
of an atomic action in an execution is to ﬁrst evaluate the expression e, called
the gate, in the current state. If the gate evaluates to false the execution fails,
otherwise the program state is updated according to the transition t. Input vari-
ables in I can be read by e and t, and output variables in O can be written
by t.
Remark 1. Atomic actions subsume many standard statements. In particular,
(nondeterministic) assignments, assertions, and assumptions. The following table
shows some examples for programs over variables x and y.
Command e t
x := x + y true x′ = x + y ∧ y′ = y
havoc x true y′ = y
assert x < y x < y x′ = x ∧ y′ = y
assume x < y true x < y ∧ x′ = x ∧ y′ = y
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Procedures. A procedure is a tuple (I,O, L, s) where I,O, L are the input,
output, and local variables of the procedure, and s is a statement composed from
skip, sequencing, if, and parallel call statements. Since only atomic actions can
refer to global variables, the variables accessed in if conditions are restricted to
the inputs, outputs, and locals of the enclosing procedure. The meaning of skip,
sequencing, and if is as expected and we focus on parallel calls.
Pcalls. A parallel call (pcall, for short) pcall (A, ι, o) (P, ι, o) (A, ι, o) consists
of a sequence of invocations of atomic actions and procedures. We refer to the
invocations as the arms of the pcall. In particular (A, ι, o) is an atomic-action
arm and (P, ι, o) is a procedure arm. An atomic-action arm executes the called
atomic action, and a procedure arm creates a child thread that executes the
statement of the called procedure. The parent thread is blocked until all arms
of the pcall ﬁnish. In the standard semantics the order of arms does not matter,
but our veriﬁcation technique will allow us to consider the atomic action arms
before and after the procedure arms to execute in the speciﬁed order. Parameter
passing is expressed using partial mappings ι, o between local variables; ι maps
formal inputs of the callee to actual inputs of the caller, and o maps actual
outputs of the caller to formal outputs of the callee. Since we do not want
to introduce races on local variables, the outputs of all arms must be disjoint
and the output of one arm cannot be an input to another arm. Finally, notice
that our general notion of a pcall subsumes sequential statements (single atomic-
action arm), synchronous procedure calls (single procedure arm), and unbounded
thread creation (recursive procedure arm).
Concurrent Programs. A concurrent program P is a tuple (gs, as, ps ,m, I),
where gs is a ﬁnite set of global variables used by the program, as is a ﬁnite
mapping from action names A to atomic actions, ps is a ﬁnite mapping from
procedure names P to procedures, m is either a procedure or action name that
denotes the entry point for program executions, and I is a set of initial stores.
For convenience we will liberally use action and procedure names to refer to the
corresponding atomic actions and procedures.
Semantics. Let P = (gs, as, ps,m, I) be a ﬁxed concurrent program. A state
consists of a global store assigning values to the global variables and a pool
of threads, each consisting of a local store assigning values to local variables
and a statement that remains to be executed. An execution is a sequence of
states, where from each state to the next some thread is selected to execute one
step. Every step that switches the executing thread is called a preemption (also
called a context switch). We distinguish between two semantics that diﬀer in
(1) preemption points, and (2) the order of executing the arms of a pcall.
In preemptive semantics, a preemption is allowed anywhere and the arms
of a pcall are arbitrarily interleaved. In cooperative semantics, a preemption is
allowed only at the call and return of a procedure, and the arms of a pcall are
executed as follows. First, the leading atomic-action arms are executed from left
to right without preemption, then all procedure arms are executed arbitrarily
interleaved, and ﬁnally the trailing atomic-action arms are executed, again from
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left to right without preemption. In other words, a preemption is only allowed
when a procedure arm of a pcall creates a new thread and when a thread termi-
nates.
For P we only consider executions that start with a single thread that execute
m from a store in I. P is called safe if there is no failing execution, i.e., an
execution that executes an atomic action whose gate evaluates to false. We
write Safe(P) if P is safe under preemptive semantics, and CSafe(P) if P is safe
under cooperative semantics.
2.1 Running Example
In this section, we introduce a sequence of three concurrent programs (Fig. 3)
to illustrate features of our concurrent programming language and the layered
approach to program correctness. Consider the program P lock1 in Fig. 3(a). The
program uses a single global Boolean variable b which is accessed by the two
atomic actions CAS and RESET. The compare-and-swap action CAS atomically
reads the current value of b and either sets b from false to true and returns
true, or leaves b true and returns false. The RESET action sets b to false and
has a gate (represented as an assertion) that states that the action must only
be called when b is true. Using these actions, the procedures Enter and Leave
implement a spinlock as follows. Enter calls the CAS action and retries (through
recursion on itself) until it succeeds to set b from false to true. Leave just
calls the RESET action which sets b back to false and thus allows another thread
executing Enter to stop spinning. Finally, the procedures Main and Worker serve
as a simple client. Main uses a pcall inside a nondeterministic if statement to
create an unbounded number of concurrent worker threads, which just acquire
the lock by calling Enter and then release the lock again by calling Leave. The
call to the empty procedure Alloc is an artifact of our extraction from a layered
concurrent program and can be removed as an optimization.
Proving P lock1 safe amounts to showing that RESET is never called with b set
to false, which expresses that P lock1 follows a locking discipline of releasing only
previously acquired locks. Doing this proof directly on P lock1 has two drawbacks.
First, the proof must relate the possible values of b with the program counters
of all running threads. In general, this approach requires sound introduction of
ghost code and results in complicated case distinctions in program invariants.
Second, the proof is not reusable across diﬀerent lock implementations. The
correctness of the client does not speciﬁcally depend on using a spinlock over
a Boolean variable, and thus the proof should not as well. We show how our
reﬁnement-based approach addresses both problems.
Program P lock2 in Fig. 3(b) is an abstraction of P lock1 that introduces an
abstract lock speciﬁcation. The global variable b is replaced by lock which
ranges over integer thread identiﬁers (0 is a dedicated value indicating that
the lock is available). The procedures Alloc, Enter and Leave are replaced by
the atomic actions ALLOC, ACQUIRE and RELEASE, respectively. ALLOC allocates
unique and non-zero thread identiﬁers using a set of integers slot to store the
identiﬁers not allocated so far. ACQUIRE blocks executions where the lock is not
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Fig. 3. Lock example
available (assume lock == 0) and sets lock to the identiﬁer of the acquiring
thread. RELEASE asserts that the releasing thread holds the lock and sets lock
to 0. Thus, the connection between P lock1 and P lock2 is given by the invariant
b <==> lock != 0 which justiﬁes that Enter reﬁnes ACQUIRE and Leave reﬁnes
RELEASE. The potential safety violation in P lock1 by the gate of RESET is pre-
served in P lock2 by the gate of RELEASE. In fact, the safety of P lock2 expresses the
stronger locking discipline that the lock can only be released by the thread that
acquired it.
Reasoning in terms of ACQUIRE and RELEASE instead of Enter and Leave is
more general, but it is also simpler! Figure 3(b) declares atomic actions with a
mover type [5], right for right mover, and left for left mover. A right mover
executed by a thread commutes to the right of any action executed by a diﬀerent
thread. Similarly, a left mover executed by thread commutes to the left of any
action executed by a diﬀerent thread. A sequence of right movers followed by
at most one non-mover followed by a sequence of left movers in a thread can
be considered atomic [10]. The reason is that any interleaved execution can
be rearranged (by commuting atomic actions), such that these actions execute
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consecutively. For P lock2 this means that Worker is atomic and thus the gate of
RELEASE can be discharged by pure sequential reasoning; ALLOC guarantees tid
!= 0 and after executing ACQUIRE we have lock == tid. As a result, we ﬁnally
obtain that the atomic action SKIP in P lock3 (Fig. 3(c)) is a sound abstraction
of procedure Main in P lock2 . Hence, we showed that program P lock1 is safe by
soundly abstracting it to P lock3 , a program that is trivially safe.
The correctness of right and left annotations on ACQUIRE and RELEASE,
respectively, depends on pair-wise commutativity checks among atomic actions
in P lock2 . These commutativity checks will fail unless we exploit the fact that
every thread identiﬁer allocated by Worker using the ALLOC action is unique. For
instance, to show that ACQUIRE executed by a thread commutes to the right of
RELEASE executed by a diﬀerent thread, it must be known that the parameters
tid to these actions are distinct from each other. The linear annotation on
the local variables named tid and the global variable slots (which is a set of
integers) is used to communicate this information.
The overall invariant encoded by the linear annotation is that the set of
values stored in slots and in local linear variables of active stack frames across
all threads are pairwise disjoint. This invariant is guaranteed by a combination of
a linear type system [14] and logical reasoning on the code of all atomic actions.
The linear type system ensures using a ﬂow analysis that a value stored in a linear
variable in an active stack frame is not copied into another linear variable via
an assignment. Each atomic action must ensure that its state update preserves
the disjointness invariant for linear variables. For actions ACQUIRE and RELEASE,
which do not modify any linear variables, this reasoning is trivial. However,
action ALLOC modiﬁes slots and updates the linear output parameter tid. Its
correctness depends on the (semantic) fact that the value put into tid is removed
from slots; this reasoning can be done using automated theorem provers.
3 Layered Concurrent Programs
A layered concurrent program represents a sequence of concurrent programs
that are connected to each other. That is, the programs derived from a layered
concurrent program share syntactic structure, but diﬀer in the granularity of
the atomic actions and the set of variables they are expressed over. In a layered
concurrent program, we associate layer numbers and layer ranges with variables
(both global and local), atomic actions, and procedures. These layer numbers
control the introduction and hiding of program variables and the summarization
of compound operations into atomic actions, and thus provide the scaﬀolding of a
reﬁnement relation. Concretely, this section shows how the concurrent programs
P lock1 , P lock2 , and P lock3 (Fig. 3) and their connections can all be expressed in a
single layered concurrent program. In Sect. 4, we discuss how to check reﬁnement
between the successive concurrent programs encoded in a layered concurrent
program.
Syntax. The syntax of layered concurrent programs is summarized in Fig. 4. Let
N be the set of non-negative integers and I the set of nonempty intervals [a, b].
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Fig. 4. Layered concurrent programs
We refer to integers as layer numbers and intervals as layer ranges. A layered
concurrent program LP is a tuple (GS ,AS , IS ,PS ,m, I) which, similarly to con-
current programs, consists of global variables, atomic actions, and procedures,
with the following diﬀerences.
1. GS maps global variables to layer ranges. For GS (v) = [a, b] we say that v is
introduced at layer a and available up to layer b.
2. AS assigns a layer range r to atomic actions denoting the layers at which an
action exists.
3. IS (with a disjoint domain from AS ) distinguishes a special type of atomic
actions called introduction actions. Introduction actions have a single layer
number n and are responsible for assigning meaning to the variables intro-
duced at layer n. Correspondingly, statements in layered concurrent programs
are extended with an icall statement for calling introduction actions.
4. PS assigns a layer number n, a layer number mapping for local variables ns,
and an atomic action A to procedures. We call n the disappearing layer and A
the refined atomic action. For every local variable v, ns(v) is the introduction
layer of v.
The pcallα statement in a layered concurrent program diﬀers from the pcall
statement in concurrent programs in two ways. First, it can only have proce-
dure arms. Second, it has a parameter α which is either ε (unannotated pcall)
or the index of one of its arms (annotated pcall). We usually omit writing ε
in unannotated pcalls.
5. m is a procedure name.
The top layer h of a layered concurrent program is the disappearing layer of m.
Intuition Behind Layer Numbers. Recall that a layered concurrent program
LP should represent a sequence of h+1 concurrent programs P1, · · · ,Ph+1 that
are connected by a sequence of h checker programs C1, · · · , Ch (cf. Fig. 1). Before
we provide formal deﬁnitions, let us get some intuition on two core mechanisms:
global variable introduction and procedure abstraction/reﬁnement.
Let v be a global variable with layer range [a, b]. The meaning of this layer
range is that the “ﬁrst” program that contains v is Ca, the checker program
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connecting Pa and Pa+1. In particular, v is not yet part of Pa. In Ca the intro-
duction actions at layer a can modify v and thus assign its meaning in terms of
all other available variables. Then v is part of Pa+1 and all programs up to and
including Pb. The “last” program containing v is Cb. In other words, when going
from a program Pi to Pi+1 the variables with upper bound i disappear and the
variables with lower bound i are introduced; the checker program Ci has access
to both and establishes their relationship.
Let P be a procedure with disappearing layer n and reﬁned atomic action
A. The meaning of the disappearing layer is that P exists in all programs from
P1 up to and including Pn. In Pn+1 and above every invocation of P is replaced
by an invocation of A. To ensure that this replacement is sound, the checker
program Cn performs a reﬁnement check that ensures that every execution of P
behaves like A. Observe that the body of procedure P itself changes from P1 to
Pn according to the disappearing layer of the procedures it calls.
With the above intuition in mind it is clear that the layer annotations in a
layered concurrent program cannot be arbitrary. For example, if procedure P
calls a procedure Q, then Q cannot have a higher disappearing layer than P , for
Q could introduce further behaviors into the program after P was replaced by
A, and those behaviors are not captured by A.
3.1 Type Checker
We describe the constraints that need to be satisﬁed for a layered concurrent
program to be well-formed. A full formalization as a type checker with top-level
judgment  LP is given in Fig. 5. For completeness, the type checker includes
standard constraints (e.g., variable scoping, parameter passing, etc.) that we are
not going to discuss.
(Atomic Action)/(Introduction Action). Global variables can only be
accessed by atomic actions and introduction actions. For a global variable v
with layer range [a, b], introduction actions with layer number a are allowed to
modify v (for sound variable introduction), and atomic actions with a layer range
contained in [a + 1, b] have access to v. Introduction actions must be nonblock-
ing, which means that every state that satisﬁes the gate must have a possible
transition to take. This ensures that introduction actions only assign meaning
to introduced variables but do not exclude any program behavior.
(If). Procedure bodies change from layer to layer because calls to procedures
become calls to atomic actions. But the control-ﬂow structure within a procedure
is preserved across layers. Therefore (local) variables accessed in an if condition
must be available on all layers to ensure that the if statement is well-deﬁned on
every layer.
(Introduction Call). Let A be an introduction action with layer number n.
Since A modiﬁes global variables introduced at layer n, icalls to A are only
allowed from procedures with disappearing layer n. Similarly, the formal output
parameters of an icall to A must have introduction layer n. The icall is only
preserved in Cn.
Layered Concurrent Programs 89
Fig. 5. Type checking rules for layered concurrent programs
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(Parallel Call). All arms in a pcall must be procedure arms invoking a proce-
dure with a disappearing layer less than or equal to the disappearing layer of the
caller. Furthermore, above the disappearing layer of the callee its reﬁned atomic
action must be available up to the disappearing layer of the caller. Parameter
passing can only be well-deﬁned if the actual inputs exist before the formal
inputs, and the formal outputs exist before the actual outputs. The sequence of
disappearing layers of the procedures in a pcall must be monotonically increas-
ing and then decreasing, such that the resulting pcall in the extracted programs
consists of procedure arms surrounded by atomic-action arms on every layer.
Annotated pcalls are only used for invocations to procedures with the same
disappearing layer n as the caller. In particular, during reﬁnement checking in
Cn only the arm with index α is allowed to modify the global state, which must
be according to the reﬁned atomic action of the caller. The remaining arms must
leave the global state unchanged.
3.2 Concurrent Program Extraction
Let LP = (GS ,AS , IS ,PS ,m, I) be a layered concurrent program such that
PS (m) = ( , , , , h, , Am). We show how to extract the programs P1, · · · ,Ph+1
by deﬁning a function Γ(LP) such that P = Γ(LP) for every  ∈ [1, h + 1].
For a local variable layer mapping ns we deﬁne the set of local variables with
layer number less then  as ns| = {v | ns(v) < }. Now the extraction function
Γ is deﬁned as
Γ(LP) = (gs, as, ps,m′, I),
where
gs = {v | GS(v) = [a, b] ∧  ∈ [a + 1, b]},
as = {A → (I,O, e, t) | AS(A) = (I,O, e, t, r) ∧  ∈ r},
ps = {P → (I ∩ ns|, O ∩ ns|, L ∩ ns|, Γ P (s)) | PS(P ) = (I,O, L, s, n,ns, ) ∧  ≤ n},
m′ =
{
m if  ∈ [1, h]
Am if  = h + 1
,
and the extraction of a statement in the body of procedure P is given by
Γ P (skip) = skip,
Γ P (s1 ; s2) = Γ
P
 (s1) ; Γ
P
 (s2),
Γ P (if e then s1 else s2) = if e then Γ
P
 (s1) else Γ
P
 (s2),
Γ P (icall (A, ι, o)) = skip,
Γ P (pcallα (Q, ι, o)) = pcall (X, ι|nsQ| , o|nsP | ),
for
PS(P ) = ( , , , , ,nsP , )
PS(Q) = ( , , , , n,nsQ, A)
and X =
{
Q if  ≤ n
A if  > n
.
Thus P includes the global and local variables that were introduced before  and
the atomic actions with  in their layer range. Furthermore, it does not contain
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introduction actions and correspondingly all icall statements are removed. Every
arm of a pcall statement, depending on the disappearing layer n of the called
procedure Q, either remains a procedure arm to Q, or is replaced by an atomic-
action arm to A, the atomic action reﬁned by Q. The input and output mappings
are restricted to the local variables at layer . The set of initial stores of P is
the same as for LP, since stores range over all program variables.
In our programming language, loops are subsumed by the more general mech-
anism of recursive procedure calls. Observe that P can indeed have recursive
procedure calls, because our type checking rules (Fig. 5) allow a pcall to invoke
a procedure with the same disappearing layer as the caller.
3.3 Running Example
We return to our lock example from Sect. 2.1. Figure 6 shows its implementa-
tion as the layered concurrent program LP lock . Layer annotations are indicated
using an @ symbol. For example, the global variable b has layer range [0, 1], all
occurrences of local variable tid have introduction layer 1, the atomic action
ACQUIRE has layer range [2, 2], and the introduction action iSetLock has layer
number 1.
First, observe that LP lock is well-formed, i.e.,  LP lock . Then it is an easy
exercise to verify that Γ(LP lock ) = P lock for  ∈ [1, 3]. Let us focus on proce-
dure Worker. In P lock1 (Fig. 3(a)) tid does not exist, and correspondingly Alloc,
Enter, and Leave do not have input respectively output parameters. Further-
more, the icall in the body of Alloc is replaced with skip. In P lock2 (Fig. 3(b))
we have tid and the calls to Alloc, Enter, and Leave are replaced with their
respective reﬁned atomic actions ALLOC, ACQUIRE, and RELEASE. The only anno-
tated pcall in LP lock is the recursive call to Enter.
In addition to representing the concurrent programs in Fig. 3, the program
LP lock also encodes the connection between them via introduction actions and
calls. The introduction action iSetLock updates lock to maintain the relation-
ship between lock and b, expressed by the predicate InvLock. It is called in
Enter in case the CAS operation successfully set b to true, and in Leave when
b is set to false. The introduction action iIncr implements linear thread identi-
ﬁers using the integer variables pos which points to the next value that can be
allocated. For every allocation, the current value of pos is returned as the new
thread identiﬁer and pos is incremented.
The variable slots is introduced at layer 1 to represent the set of unallocated
identiﬁers. It contains all integers no less than pos, an invariant that is expressed
by the predicate InvAlloc and maintained by the code of iIncr. The purpose
of slots is to encode linear allocation of thread identiﬁers in a way that the
body of iIncr can be locally shown to preserve the disjointness invariant for
linear variables; slots plays a similar role in the speciﬁcation of the atomic
action ALLOC in P2. The variable pos is both introduced and hidden at layer 1
so that it exists neither in P lock1 nor P lock2 . However, pos is present in the checker
program C1 that connects P lock1 and P lock2 .
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Fig. 6. Lock example (layered concurrent program)
The bodies of procedures Cas and Reset are not shown in Fig. 6 because
they are not needed. They disappear at layer 0 and are replaced by the atomic
actions CAS and RESET, respectively, in P lock1 .
The degree of compactness aﬀorded by layered programs (as in Fig. 6) over
separate speciﬁcation of each concurrent program (as in Fig. 3) increases rapidly
with the size of the program and the maximum depth of procedure calls. In our
experience, for realistic programs such as a concurrent garbage collector [7] or a
data-race detector [15], the saving in code duplication is signiﬁcant.
4 Refinement Checking
Section 3 described how a layered concurrent program LP encodes a sequence
P1, . . . ,Ph,Ph+1 of concurrent programs. In this section, we show how the safety
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of any concurrent program in the sequence is implied by the safety of its suc-
cessor, ultimately allowing the safety of P1 to be established by the safety of
Ph+1.
There are three ingredients to connecting P to P+1 for any  ∈ [1, h]—
reduction, projection, and abstraction. Reduction allows us to conclude the
safety of a concurrent program under preemptive semantics by proving safety
only under cooperative semantics.
Theorem 1 (Reduction). Let P be a concurrent program. If MSafe(P) and
CSafe(P), then Safe(P).
The judgment MSafe(P) uses logical commutativity reasoning and mover types
to ensure that cooperative safety is suﬃcient for preemptive safety (Sect. 4.1).
We use this theorem to justify reasoning about CSafe(P) rather than Safe(P).
The next step in connecting P to P+1 is to introduce computation intro-
duced at layer  into the cooperative semantics of P. This computation com-
prises global and local variables together with introduction actions and calls to
them. We refer to the resulting program at layer  as ˜P.
Theorem 2 (Projection). Let LP be a layered concurrent program with top
layer h and  ∈ [1, h]. If CSafe( ˜P), then CSafe(P).
Since introduction actions are nonblocking and ˜P is safe under cooperative
semantics, every cooperative execution of P can be obtained by projecting away
the computation introduced at layer . This observation allows us to conclude
that every cooperative execution of P is also safe.
Finally, we check that the safety of the cooperative semantics of ˜P is ensured
by the safety of the preemptive semantics of the next concurrent program P+1.
This connection is established by reasoning about the cooperative semantics of
a concurrent checker program C that is automatically constructed from LP.
Theorem 3 (Abstraction). Let LP be a layered concurrent program with top
layer h and  ∈ [1, h]. If CSafe(C) and Safe(P+1), then CSafe( ˜P).
The checker program C is obtained by instrumenting the code of ˜P with extra
variables and procedures that enable checking that procedures disappearing at
layer  reﬁne their atomic action speciﬁcations (Sect. 4.2).
Our reﬁnement check between two consecutive layers is summarized by the
following corollary of Theorems 1–3.
Corollary 1. Let LP be a layered concurrent program with top layer h and
 ∈ [1, h]. If MSafe(P), CSafe(C) and Safe(P+1), then Safe(P).
The soundness of our reﬁnement checking methodology for layered concurrent
programs is obtained by repeated application of Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. Let LP be a layered concurrent program with top layer h. If
MSafe(P) and CSafe(C) for all  ∈ [1, h] and Safe(Ph+1), then Safe(P1).
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4.1 From Preemptive to Cooperative Semantics
We present the judgment MSafe(P) that allows us to reason about a concur-
rent program P under cooperative semantics instead of preemptive semantics.
Intuitively, we want to use the commutativity of individual atomic actions to
rearrange the steps of any execution under preemptive semantics in such a way
that it corresponds to an execution under cooperative semantics. We consider
mappings M ∈ Action → {N,R,L,B} that assign mover types to atomic actions;
N for non-mover, R for right mover, L for left mover, and B for both mover. The
judgment MSafe(P) requires a mapping M that satisﬁes two conditions.
First, the atomic actions in P must satisfy the following logical commutativity
conditions [7], which can be discharged by a theorem prover.
– Commutativity: If A1 is a right mover or A2 is a left mover, then the eﬀect
of A1 followed by A2 can also be achieved by A2 followed by A1.
– Forward preservation: If A1 is a right mover or A2 is a left mover, then the
failure of A2 after A1 implies that A2 must also fail before A1.
– Backward preservation: If A2 is a left mover (and A1 is an arbitrary), then
the failure of A1 before A2 implies that A1 must also fail after A2.
– Nonblocking: If A is a left mover, then A cannot block.
Second, the sequence of atomic actions in preemptive executions of P must
be such that the desired rearrangement into cooperative executions is possible.
Given a preemptive execution, consider, for each
thread individually, a labeling of execution steps
where atomic action steps are labeled with their
mover type and procedure calls and returns are
labeled with Y (for yield). The nondeterministic
atomicity automaton A on the right deﬁnes all
allowed sequences. Intuitively, when we map the
execution steps of a thread to a run in the automaton, the state RM denotes
that we are in the right mover phase in which we can stay until the occurrence
of a non-right mover (L or N). Then we can stay in the left mover phase (state
LM) by executing left movers, until a preemption point (Y) takes us back to
RM. Let E be the mapping from edge labels to the set of edges that contain the
label, e.g., E(R) = {RM → RM,RM → LM}. Thus we have a representation of
mover types as sets of edges in A, and we deﬁne E(A) = E(M(A)). Notice that
the set representation is closed under relation composition ◦ and intersection,
and behaves as expected, e.g., E(R) ◦ E(L) = E(N).
Now we deﬁne an intraprocedural control ﬂow analysis that lifts E to a map-
ping ̂E on statements. Intuitively, x → y ∈ ̂E(s) means that every execution
of the statement s has a run in A from x to y. Our analysis does not have to
be interprocedural, since procedure calls and returns are labeled with Y, allow-
ing every possible state transition in A. MSafe(P) requires ̂E(s) = ∅ for every
procedure body s in P, where ̂E is deﬁned as follows:
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Ê(skip) = E(B) Ê(s1 ; s2) = Ê(s1) ◦ Ê(s2) Ê(if e then s1 else s2) = Ê(s1) ∩ Ê(s2)
Ê(pcall A1P A2) =
{ E∗(A1A2) if P = ε
E(L) ◦ E∗(A1) ◦ E(Y) ◦ E∗(A2) ◦ E(R) if P 	= ε
Skip is a both mover, sequencing composes edges, and if takes the edges
possible in both branches. In the arms of a pcall we omit writing the input and
output maps because they are irrelevant to the analysis. Let us ﬁrst focus on
the case P = ε with no procedure arms. In the preemptive semantics all arms
are arbitrarily interleaved and correspondingly we deﬁne the function
E∗(A1 · · ·An) =
⋂
τ∈Sn
E(Aτ(1)) ◦ · · · ◦ E(Aτ(n))
to consider all possible permutations (τ ranges over the symmetric group Sn)
and take the edges possible in all permutations. Observe that E∗ evaluates to
non-empty in exactly four cases: E(N) for {B}∗N{B}∗, E(B) for {B}∗, E(R) for
{R,B}∗ \{B}∗, and E(L) for {L,B}∗ \{B}∗. These are the mover-type sequences
for which an arbitrary permutation (coming from a preemptive execution) can
be rearranged to the order given by the pcall (corresponding to cooperative
execution).
In the case P = ε there is a preemption point under cooperative semantics
between A1 and A2, the actions in A1 are executed in order before the preemp-
tion, and the actions in A2 are executed in order after the preemption. To ensure
that the cooperative execution can simulate an arbitrarily interleaved preemp-
tive execution of the pcall, we must be able to move actions in A1 to the left and
actions in A2 to the right of the preemption point. We enforce this condition by
requiring that A1 is all left (or both) movers and A2 all right (or both) movers,
expressed by the leading E(L) and trailing E(R) in the edge composition.
4.2 Refinement Checker Programs
In this section, we describe the construction of checker programs that justify the
formal connection between successive concurrent programs in a layered concur-
rent program. The description is done by example. In particular, we show the
checker program Clock1 that establishes the connection between P lock1 and P lock2
(Fig. 3) of our running example.
Overview. Cooperative semantics splits any execution of P lock1 into a sequence
of preemption-free execution fragments separated by preemptions. Veriﬁcation
of Clock1 must ensure that for all such executions, the set of procedures that
disappear at layer 1 behave like their atomic action speciﬁcations. That is, the
procedures Enter and Leave must behave like their speciﬁcations ACQUIRE and
RELEASE, respectively. It is important to note that this goal of checking reﬁne-
ment is easier than verifying that P lock1 is safe. Reﬁnement checking may succeed
even though P lock1 fails; the guarantee of reﬁnement is that such a failure can be
simulated by a failure in P lock2 . The construction of Clock1 can be understood in
96 B. Kragl and S. Qadeer
two steps. First, the program ˜P lock1 shown in Fig. 7 extends P lock1 (Fig. 3(a)) with
the variables introduced at layer 1 (globals lock, pos, slots and locals tid) and
the corresponding introduction actions (iIncr and iSetLock). Second, Clock1 is
obtained from ˜P lock1 by instrumenting the procedures to encode the reﬁnement
check, described in the remainder of this section.
Fig. 7. Lock example (variable introduction at layer 1)
Context for Refinement. There are two kinds of procedures, those that con-
tinue to exist at layer 2 (such as Main and Worker) and those that disappear at
layer 1 (such as Enter and Leave). Clock1 does not need to verify anything about
the ﬁrst kind. These procedures only provide the context for reﬁnement checking
and thus all invocation of an atomic action (I,O, e, t) in any atomic-action arm of
a pcall is converted into the invocation of a fresh atomic action (I,O, true, e∧ t).
In other words, the assertions in procedures that continue to exist at layer 2
are converted into assumptions for the reﬁnement checking at layer 1; these
assertions are veriﬁed during the reﬁnement checking on a higher layer. In our
example, Main and Worker do not have atomic-action arms, although this is
possible in general.
Refinement Instrumentation. We illustrate the instrumentation of proce-
dures Enter and Leave in Fig. 8. The core idea is to track updates by preemption-
free execution fragments to the shared variables that continue to exist at layer 2.
There are two such variables—lock and slots. We capture snapshots of lock
and slots in the local variables _lock and _slots and use these snapshots
to check that the updates to lock and slots behave according to the reﬁned
atomic action. In general, any path from the start to the end of the body of a
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Fig. 8. Instrumented procedures Enter and Leave (layer 1 checker program)
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procedure may comprise many preemption-free execution fragments. The checker
program must ensure that exactly one of these fragments behaves like the speci-
ﬁed atomic action; all other fragments must leave lock and slot unchanged. To
track whether the atomic action has already happened, we use two local Boolean
variables—pc and done. Both variables are initialized to false, get updated to
true during the execution, and remain at true thereafter. The variable pc is set
to true at the end of the ﬁrst preemption-free execution fragment that mod-
iﬁes the tracked state, which is expressed by the macro *CHANGED* on line 1.
The variable done is set to true at the end of the ﬁrst preemption-free execu-
tion fragment that behaves like the reﬁned atomic action. For that, the macros
*RELEASE* and *ACQUIRE* on lines 2 and 3 express the transition relations of
RELEASE and ACQUIRE, respectively. Observe that we have the invariant pc ==>
done. The reason we need both pc and done is to handle the case where the
reﬁned atomic action may stutter (i.e., leave the state unchanged).
Instrumenting Leave. We ﬁrst look at the instrumentation of Leave. Line 8
initializes the snapshot variables. Recall that a preemption inside the code of
a procedure is introduced only at a pcall containing a procedure arm. Conse-
quently, the body of Leave is preemption-free and we need to check reﬁnement
across a single execution fragment. This checking is done by lines 14–16. The
assertion on line 14 checks that if any tracked variable has changed since the last
snapshot, (1) such a change happens for the ﬁrst time (!pc), and (2) the current
value is related to the snapshot value according to the speciﬁcation of RELEASE.
Line 15 updates pc to track whether any change to the tracked variables has
happened so far. Line 16 updates done to track whether RELEASE has happened
so far. The assertion at line 18 checks that RELEASE has indeed happened before
Leave returns. The assumption at line 9 blocks those executions which can be
simulated by the failure of RELEASE. It achieves this eﬀect by assuming the gate
of RELEASE in states where pc is still false (i.e., RELEASE has not yet happened).
The assumption yields the constraint lock != 0 which together with the invari-
ant InvLock (Fig. 6) proves that the gate of RESET does not fail.
The veriﬁcation of Leave illustrates an important principle of our approach
to reﬁnement. The gates of atomic actions invoked by a procedure P disap-
pearing at layer  are veriﬁed using a combination of invariants established on
C and pending assertions at layer  + 1 encoded as the gate of the atomic
action reﬁned by P . For Leave speciﬁcally, assert b in RESET is propagated to
assert tid != nil && lock == tid in RELEASE. The latter assertion is veri-
ﬁed in the checker program Clock2 when Worker, the caller of RELEASE, is shown
to reﬁne the action SKIP which is guaranteed not to fail since its gate is true.
Instrumenting Enter. The most sophisticated feature in a concurrent pro-
gram is a pcall. The instrumentation of Leave explains the instrumentation of
the simplest kind of pcall with only atomic-action arms. We now illustrate the
instrumentation of a pcall containing a procedure arm using the procedure Enter
which reﬁnes the atomic action ACQUIRE and contains a pcall to Enter itself. The
instrumentation of this pcall is contained in lines 30–43.
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A pcall with a procedure arm is challenging for two reasons. First, the callee
disappears at the same layer as the caller so the checker program must reason
about reﬁnement for both the caller and the callee. This challenge is addressed
by the code in lines 34–40. At line 34, we introduce a nondeterministic choice
between two code paths—then branch to check reﬁnement of the caller and else
branch to check reﬁnement of the callee. An explanation for this nondeterministic
choice is given in the next two paragraphs. Second, a pcall with a procedure arm
introduces a preemption creating multiple preemption-free execution fragments.
This challenge is addressed by two pieces of code. First, we check that lock
and slots are updated correctly (lines 30–32) by the preemption-free execution
fragment ending before the pcall. Second, we update the snapshot variables
(line 42) to enable the veriﬁcation of the preemption-free execution fragment
beginning after the pcall.
Lines 35–37 in the then branch check reﬁnement against the atomic action
speciﬁcation of the caller, exploiting the atomic action speciﬁcation of the callee.
The actual veriﬁcation is performed in a fresh procedure Check_Enter_Enter
invoked on line 35. Notice that this procedure depends on both the caller and
the callee (indicated in colors), and that it preserves a necessary preemption
point. The procedure has input parameters tid to receive the input of the caller
(for reﬁnement checking) and x to receive the input of the callee (to generate the
behavior of the callee). Furthermore, pc may be updated in Check_Enter_Enter
and thus passed as both an input and output parameter. In the body of the
procedure, the invocation of action ACQUIRE on line 56 overapproximates the
behavior of the callee. In the layered concurrent program (Fig. 6), the (recur-
sive) pcall to Enter in the body of Enter is annotated with 1. This annotation
indicates that for any execution passing through this pcall, ACQUIRE is deemed
to occur during the execution of its unique arm. This is reﬂected in the checker
program by updating done to true on line 37; the update is justiﬁed because of
the assertion in Check_Enter_Enter at line 58. If the pcall being translated was
instead unannotated, line 37 would be omitted.
Lines 39–40 in the else branch ensure that using the atomic action speci-
ﬁcation of the callee on line 56 is justiﬁed. Allowing the execution to continue
to the callee ensures that the called procedure is invoked in all states allowed
by P1. However, the execution is blocked once the call returns to ensure that
downstream code sees the side-eﬀect on pc and the snapshot variables.
To summarize, the crux of our instrumentation of procedure arms is to com-
bine reﬁnement checking of caller and callee. We explore the behaviors of the
callee to check its reﬁnement. At the same time, we exploit the atomic action
speciﬁcation of the callee to check reﬁnement of the caller.
Instrumenting Unannotated Procedure Arms. Procedure Enter illus-
trates the instrumentation of an annotated procedure arm. The instrumentation
of an unannotated procedure arm (both in an annotated or unannotated pcall)
is simpler, because we only need to check that the tracked state is not modiﬁed.
For such an arm to a procedure reﬁning atomic action Action, we introduce a
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procedure Check_Action (which is independent of the caller) comprising three
instructions: take snapshots, pcall A, and assert !*CHANGED*.
Pcalls with Multiple Arms. Our examples show the instrumentation of pcalls
with a single arm. Handling multiple arms is straightforward, since each arm is
translated independently. Atomic action arms stay unmodiﬁed, annotated pro-
cedure arms are replaced with the corresponding Check_Caller_Callee pro-
cedure, and unannotated procedure arms are replaced with the corresponding
Check_Action procedure.
Output Parameters. Our examples illustrate reﬁnement checking for atomic
actions that have no output parameters. In general, a procedure and its atomic
action speciﬁcation may return values in output parameters. We handle this
generalization but lack of space does not allow us to present the technical details.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented layered concurrent programs, a programming nota-
tion to succinctly capture a multi-layered reﬁnement proof capable of connect-
ing a deeply-detailed implementation to a highly-abstract speciﬁcation. We pre-
sented an algorithm to extract from the concurrent layered program the indi-
vidual concurrent programs, from the most concrete to the most abstract. We
also presented an algorithm to extract a collection of reﬁnement checker pro-
grams that establish the connection among the sequence of concurrent pro-
grams encoded by the layered concurrent program. The cooperative safety of
the checker programs and the preemptive safety of the most abstract concurrent
program suﬃces to prove the preemptive safety of the most concrete concurrent
program.
Layered programs have been implemented in Civl, a deductive veriﬁer for
concurrent programs, implemented as a conservative extension to the Boogie ver-
iﬁer [3]. Civl has been used to verify a complex concurrent garbage collector [6]
and a state-of-the-art data-race detection algorithm [15]. In addition to these
two large benchmarks, around ﬁfty smaller programs (including a ticket lock
and a lock-free stack) are available at https://github.com/boogie-org/boogie.
There are several directions for future work. We did not discuss how to verify
an individual checker program. Civl uses the Owicki-Gries method [13] and rely-
guarantee reasoning [8] to verify checker programs. But researchers are exploring
many diﬀerent techniques for veriﬁcation of concurrent programs. It would be
interesting to investigate whether heterogeneous techniques could be brought to
bear on checker programs at diﬀerent layers.
In this paper, we focused exclusively on veriﬁcation and did not discuss code
generation, an essential aspect of any programming system targeting the con-
struction of veriﬁed programs. There is a lot of work to be done in connecting
the most concrete program in a concurrent layered program to executable code.
Most likely, diﬀerent execution platforms will impose diﬀerent obligations on
the most concrete program and the general idea of layered concurrent programs
would be specialized for diﬀerent target platforms.
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Scalable veriﬁcation is a challenge as the size of programs being veriﬁed
increases. Traditionally, scalability has been addressed using modular veriﬁca-
tion techniques but only for single-layer programs. It would be interesting to
explore modularity techniques for concurrent layered programs in the context of
a reﬁnement-oriented proof system.
Layered concurrent programs bring new challenges and opportunities to the
design of programming languages and development environments. Integrating
layers into a programming language requires intuitive syntax to specify layer
information and atomic actions. For example, ordered layer names can be more
readable and easier to refactor than layer numbers. An integrated development
environment could provide diﬀerent views of the layered concurrent program. For
example, it could show the concurrent program, the checker program, and the
introduced code at a particular layer. Any updates made in these views should
be automatically reﬂected back into the layered concurrent program.
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